Abstract. We study the role of randomness in multi-party private computations. In particular, we give several results that prove the existence of a randomness-rounds tradeo in multi-party private computation of xor. We show that with a single random bit, (n) rounds are necessary and su cient to privately compute xor of n input bits. With d 2 random bits, (log n=d) rounds are necessary, and O(logn= logd) are su cient.
1. Introduction. A 1-private (or simply, private) protocol A for computing a function f is a protocol that allows n players, P i , 1 i n, each possessing an individual secret input, x i , to compute the value of f(x) in a way that no single player learns more about the initial inputs of other players than what is revealed by the value of f(x) and its own input 1 . The players are assumed to be honest but curious. Namely, they all follow the prescribed protocol A but they could try to get additional information by considering the messages they receive during the execution of the protocol. Private computations in this setting were the subject of a considerable amount of work, e.g., BGW88, CCD88, BB89, CK89, K89, B89, FY92, CK92, CGK90, CGK92, KMO94]. One crucial ingredient in private protocols is the use of randomness. Quantifying the amount of randomness needed for computing functions privately is the subject of the present work.
Randomness as a resource was extensively studied in the last decade. Methods for saving random bits range over pseudo-random generators BM84, Y82, N90], techniques for re-cycling random bits IZ89, CW89], sources of weak randomness CG88, VV85, Z91], and constructions of di erent kinds of small probability spaces NN90, AGHP90, S92, KM93, KM94, KK94] (which sometimes even allow to eliminate the use of randomness). A di erent direction of research is a quantitative study of the role of randomness in speci c contexts, e.g., RS89, KPU88, BGG90, CG90, BGS94, BSV94] . In this work, we initiate a quantitative study of randomness in private computations. We mainly concentrate on the speci c task of computing the xor of n input bits. However, most of our results extend to any boolean function. The task of computing xor was the subject of previous research due to its being a basic linear operation and its relative simplicity FY92, CK92] .
It is known as a \folklore theorem" (and is not di cult to show) that private computation of xor cannot be carried out deterministically (for n 3). On the other hand, with a single random bit such a computation becomes possible: At the rst round player P n chooses a random bit r and sends to P 1 the bit x n r. Then, in round i (2 i n) player P i?1 xors its bit x i?1 with the message it received in the previous round, and sends the result to P i . Finally, P n xors the message it received with the random bit r. Both the correctness and privacy of this protocol are easy to verify. The main drawback of this protocol is that it takes n rounds. Another protocol for this task computes xor in two rounds but requires a linear number of random bits: In the rst round each player P i chooses a random bit r i . Then, player P i sends x i r i to P 1 and r i to P 2 . In the second round P 2 xors all the (random) bits it received in the rst round and sends the result to P 1 which xors all the messages it received during the protocol to get the value of the function. Again, both the correctness and privacy of this protocol are not hard to verify.
In this work we prove that there is a tradeo between the amount of randomness and the number of rounds in private computations of xor. For example, we show that while with a single random bit (n) rounds are necessary and su cient 2 , with two random bits O(log n) rounds su ce. 3 Namely, with a single additional random bit, the number of rounds is signi cantly reduced. Additional bits give a much more \modest" saving. More precisely, we prove that with d 2 random bits O(log n= log d) rounds su ce and (log n=d) rounds are required. Our upper bound is achieved using a new method that enables us to use linear combinations of random bits again and again (while preserving the privacy). The lower bounds are proved using combinatorial arguments, and they are strong in the sense that they also apply to protocols that are allowed to make errors, and that they actually show a lower bound on the expected number of rounds. We also show that if protocols are restricted to certain natural types (that include, in particular, the protocol that achieves the upper bound) we can even improve the lower bound and show that (log n= log d) rounds are necessary and su cient.
Our lower bound techniques apply not only to the xor function, but in fact give lower bounds on the number of rounds for any boolean function in terms of the sensitivity of the function. Namely, we prove that with d 2 random bits (log S(f)=d) rounds are necessary to privately compute a boolean function f, whose sensitivity is 2 More precisely, dn=2e rounds. This upper bound is achieved by a slight modi cation of the rst protocol above. Assume, for simplicity, that n is even. At the rst round, player P n sends x n r to player P 1 , and at the same time sends r to player P n?1 . The players then continue as in the above protocol, forwarding messages in parallel until the two messages meet. More precisely, in round i, 2 i n 2 , player P i?1 xors the message it received with its own input and sends it to player P i and player P n?(i?1) xors the message it received with its own input and sends it to player P n?i . In round n 2 , player P n 2 receives two messages and can compute the value of the function by xoring the two messages together with its own input. All logarithms are base 2, unless otherwise indicated. 2 S(f). With a single random bit (d = 1) (S(f)) rounds are necessary. The question whether private computations in general can be carried out in constant number of rounds was previously addressed BB89, BFKR90] . In light of our results, a promising approach to investigate this question may be by proving that if a constant number of rounds is su cient then a large number of random bits is required.
Subsequent to our work, several other works were done regarding the amount of randomness in privacy. In particular, the amount of randomness required for computing the function xor t-privately, for t 2, was studied in BDPV95, KM96]; in KOR96] it is shown that the boolean functions that can be computed privately with a constant number of random bits are exactly the functions that have linear size boolean circuits. Further results on randomness in private computations appear in CKOR97].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give some de nitions. In Section 3 we give an upper bound on the number of rounds required to privately compute xor. In section 4 we give lower bounds on the number of rounds to privately compute a boolean function, in terms of its sensitivity. We conclude in Section 5 with lower bounds on the expected number of rounds in terms of the average sensitivity of the function being computed. The appendix contains the improved lower bounds for restricted types of protocols.
2. Preliminaries. We give here a description of the protocols we consider, and de ne the privacy property of protocols. More rigorous de nitions of the protocols are given in Section 4.1.
Let f : f0;1g n ! f0;1g be any boolean function. A set of n players P i (1 i n), each possessing a single input bit x i (known only to it), collaborate in a protocol to compute the value of f(x). The protocol operates in rounds. In each round each player may toss some coins, and then sends messages to the other players (messages are sent over private channels so that other than the intended receiver no other player can listen to them). It then receives the messages sent to it by the other players. In addition, each player at a certain round chooses to output the value of the function. We assume that each player knows its serial number and the total number of players n. We may also assume that each player P i is provided with a read-only random tape R i from which it reads random bits (rather than toss coins).
Each player P i receives during the execution of the protocol a sequence of messages. Let c i be a random variable of the communication string seen by player P i , and let C i be a particular communication string seen by P i . Informally, privacy with respect to player P i means that player P i cannot learn anything (in particular, the inputs of the other players) from C i , except what is implied by its input bit, and the value of the function computed. Formally, Definition 2.1. (Privacy) A protocol A for computing a function f is private with respect to player P i if for any two input vectorsx andỹ, such that f(x) = f(ỹ) and x i = y i , for any sequence of messages C i , and for any random tape R i provided to P i , Pr c i = C i jR i ;x] = Pr c i = C i jR i ;ỹ]; 3 where the probability is over the random tapes of all other players.
3. Upper Bound. This section presents a protocol which allows n players to use d 2 random bits for computing xor privately. This protocol takes O(log d n) rounds.
(For the case d = 1 a similar protocol that uses dn=2e rounds was already described in the introduction.) All arithmetic operations in this section are done modulo 2.
Consider the following protocol (which we call the basic protocol): First organize the n players in a tree. The degree of the root of the tree is d+1, and the degree of any other internal node is d (assume for simplicity that n is such that this forms a complete tree). The computation starts from the leaves and goes towards the root by sending messages (each of them of a single bit) as follows: Each leaf player P i sends its input bit x i to its parent in the tree. Each internal node, after receiving messages from its d children, sums them up (modulo 2) together with its input bit x i and sends the result to its parent. Finally, the root player sums up the d + 1 messages it receives together with its input bit and the result is the output of the protocol.
While a simple induction shows the correctness of this protocol, and it clearly runs in O(log d n) rounds, it is obvious that it does not maintain the required privacy. The second idea will be to \mask" each of the messages sent in the basic protocol by an appropriate random bit (constructed using the d random bits available), in a way that these masks will disappear at the end, and we will be left with the (un-masked) output. To do so we assign the nodes of the above tree vectors in GF 2 d ] as follows (the meaning of those vectors will become clear soon): Assign to the root the vector (0; : : :; 0). The children of the root will be assigned d + 1 (non-zero) vectors such that the vectors in any d-size subset of them are linearly independent and the sum of all the d + 1 vectors is (0; : : : ; 0) (for example, the d unit vectors together with the (1; : : : ; 1) vector satisfy these requirements). Finally, in a recursive way, given an internal node which is assigned a vector v, we assign to its d children d linearly independent vectors whose sum is v (note that in particular none of these vectors is the0 vector) 4 .
We now show how to use the vectors we assigned to the nodes, so as to get a private protocol. We will assume that the random bits b 1 ; : : :; b d are chosen by some external processor. We will later see that this assumption can be eliminated easily. Let v be the vector assigned to some player which is a leaf in the tree. We will give this player a single bit r v = v b, where b = (b 1 ; : : :; b d ) is the vector consisting of the d random bits, and the product is an inner product (modulo 2). The players will use the basic protocol, described above, with the modi cation that a player in a leaf also xors its message with the bit r v it received (the other players behave exactly as before). We claim that for every player P i , if in the basic protocol it sends the message m when the input vector isx, then in the modi ed protocol it sends the message m + (v i b), where v i is the vector assigned to this player. The proof goes by induction: It is trivially true for the leaf players. For internal nodes the message is calculated by adding the input of the players to the sum of the incoming messages. Using, the induction hypothesis this sum is P d k=1 m k + (v k b)], where m k is the message received from the k'th child in the basic protocol, and v k is the vector assigned to the k'th child. Since the construction is such that v i , the vector assigned to P i , satis es v i = P d k=1 v k , then a simple algebraic manipulation proves the induction step. In particular, since the root is assigned the vector (0; : : : ; 0), its output equals the output of the basic protocol. Hence, the correctness follows.
We now prove the privacy property of the protocol. The leaf players do not receive any message, hence there is nothing to prove. Let P j be an internal node in the tree. Denote by s 1 ; : : : ; s d the messages it receives. We claim that for every vector w = Finally, note that we assumed that the random choices were made by some external processor. However, we can let one of the leaf players randomly choose the bits b 1 ; : : :; b d and supply each of the leaf players with the appropriate bit r v . As the leaf players only send messages in the protocol, the special processor that selects the random bits gets no advantage.
Note that if a player is non-honest it can easily prevent the other players from computing the correct output. However, it cannot get any additional information in the above protocol, since the only message each player gets after sending its own message is the value of the function. We have thus proved the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. The function xor on n input bits can be computed privately using d 2 random bits in O(log n= log d) rounds.
4. Lower Bounds. In this section we prove several lower bounds on the number of rounds required to privately compute a boolean function, given that the total number of random bits the players can toss is d. The lower bound is given in terms of the sensitivity of the function. In Section 4.1 we give some formal de nitions. In Section 4.2 we introduce the notion of sensitivity and present a lemma, central to our proofs, about sensitivity of functions. The proof of the lower bound appears in Section 4.3.
4.1. Preliminaries. We rst give a formal de nition for the protocols. A protocol operates in rounds. In each round each player P i , based on the value of its input bit x i , the values of the messages it received in previous rounds, and the values of the coins it tossed in previous rounds, tosses a certain number of additional coins, and sends messages to the other players. The values of these messages may depend on all of the above, including the coins just tossed by P i . The player may also choose to output the value of the function as calculated by itself (this is done only once by each player). Then, each player P i receives the messages sent to it by the other players. To de ne the protocol more formally, we give the following de nition:
A time-t partial view of player P i consists of its input bit x i , the messages it has received in the rst t ? 1 rounds, and the coins it tossed in the rst t ? 1 rounds. We denote it by PV iew t i . A time-t view of player P i consists of its input bit x i , the messages it has received in the rst t ? 1 rounds, and the coins it tossed in the rst t rounds.
We denote it by V iew t i . Intuitively, the partial view of a player P i in round t determines how many coins (if at all) P i will toss in round t. Then, its view (which includes those newly tossed coins) determines the messages P i will send in round t, and whether and which value it will output as the value of f. The formal de nition of a protocol is given below: values), which determine the message sent by P i to P j at round k.
To quantify the amount of randomness used by a protocol we give the following de nition: Definition 4.3. A d-random protocol is a protocol such that for any input assignment, the total number of coins tossed by all players in any execution is at most d.
Note that the de nition allows that in di erent executions di erent players will toss the coins. This may depend on both the input of the players, and previous coin tosses. Next, we de ne the correctness of a protocol. We usually consider protocols that are always correct; protocols that are allowed to err will be considered in Section 5.1. Definition 4.4. A protocol to compute a function f is a protocol such that for any input vectorx and every i, player P i always correctly outputs the value of f(x).
It is sometime convenient to assume that each player P i is provided with a random tape R i , from which it reads random bits (rather than to assume that the player tosses random coins). The number of random coins tossed by player P i is thus the rightmost position of this tape that it reads. We thus denote by R i a speci c random tape provided to player P i , and byR = (R 1 ; : : : ; R n ) the vector or the random tapes of all the players (r = (r 1 ; : : : ; r n ) will denote the random variable for these tapes and vector of tapes). Note that if we xR, we obtain a deterministic protocol. Furthermore, V iew t i , for any i and t, is a function of the input assignmentx, and the random tapes of the players. We can thus write it as V iew t i (x;r). We denote by T i (x;R)) the round number in which player P i outputs its result given input assignmentx and random tapes for the players R.
Definition 4.5. (Rounds Complexity) An r-round protocol to compute a function f is a protocol to compute f such that for all i,x,R, we have T i (x;R)) r.
For the purpose of our proofs, we slightly modify our view of the protocol in the following way. Fix an arbitrary binary encoding for the messages in M. We will consider a protocol where each player sends instead of a single message from M, a set of boolean messages that represent the binary encoding of the message to be sent in the original protocol. These messages are sent \in parallel" in the same round. Henceforth when we refer to messages we refer to these binary messages. Clearly, the number of rounds remains the same.
4.2. Sensitivity of Functions. In this section we include some de nitions related to functions f : f0;1g n ! D, where D is some nite domain. Then, we present some useful properties related to these de nitions. The following claim gives a lower bound on the degree of error if we evaluate a 7 function f by means of another function g, in terms of their average sensitivities. We use this property in our proofs.
Claim 4.7. Consider any two functions f; g : f0;1g n ! D. Then f(x) = g(x) for at most 2 n (1 ? AS(f)?AS(g) 2n ) input assignmentsx. Proof. Consider the n-dimensional hypercube. An f-good edge is an edge e = (x;ỹ) such that f(x) 6 = f(ỹ). By the de nitions, the number of f-good edges is exactly 2 n AS(f) 2 . Therefore, there are at least 2 n AS(f)?AS(g) 2 edges which are f-good but not g-good. For each such edge e = (x;ỹ) either f(x) 6 = g(x) or f(ỹ) 6 = g(ỹ). Since the degree of each vertex in the hypercube is n there must be at least 2 n AS(f)?AS(g) 2n inputs on which f and g do not agree.
Next, we prove a lemma that bounds the growth of the sensitivity of a combination of functions. This lemma plays a central role in the proofs of our lower bounds, and any improvement on it will immediately improve our lower bounds. There is at least one index j such that q j = 1, and since the sensitivity of f j is at most C, there can be at most C assignments Y (i) with the value q. We get that the total number of assignments Y (i) for which F has a value other than (0; : : : ; 0) is at most C (2 d ? 1).
4.3. Lower Bound on the Number of Rounds. In this subsection we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9. Let A be an r-round d-random (d 2) private protocol to compute a boolean function f. Then, r = (log S(f)=d). The rst step of our proof uses the d-randomness property of the protocol to show that the number of views a player can see on a xed inputx is at most 2 d (over the di erent random tapes of all the players). Note that this is not obvious; although only d coins are tossed during every execution, the identity of the players that toss these coins may depend on the outcome of previous coin tosses.
Lemma 4.10. Consider a private d-random protocol to compute a boolean function f. Fix an inputx. Let C k i (x;r) be the communication string seen by player P i up to round k on inputx and vector of random tapesr. Then, for every player P i , C k i (x;r) can assume at most 2 d di erent values (over the di erent vectors of random tapesr).
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An obvious bound is S(F) C m. However, for reasons that will become clear soon we are interested in bounds which are independent of m.
Proof
and the outcome of the previous coins. Therefore, the di erent executions on inputx can be described using the following binary tree: In each node of the tree we have a name of a player P j that tosses a coin. The two outgoing edges from this node, labeled 0 and 1 according to the outcome of the coin, lead to two nodes labeled P k and Pr espectively (k;`, and j need not be distinct) which is the identity of the player to toss the next coin. If no additional coin toss occurs, the node is labeled \nil"; there are no outgoing edges from a nil node. By the d-randomness property of the protocol, the depth of the above tree is at most d, hence it has at most 2 d root-to-leaf paths. Every possible run of the protocol is described by one root-to-leaf path. Such a path determines all the messages sent in the protocol, which player tosses coins and when, and the outcome of these coins. In particular each path determines for any P i the value of C k i (x;r) (for any k). Hence, C k i (x;r) can assume at most 2 d di erent values. In the following proof we restrict our attention to a speci c deterministic protocols derived from the original protocol by xing speci c vector of random tapes R = (R 1 ; : : :; R n ) for the n players. In such a deterministic protocol the views of the players are functions of only the input assignmentx.
Lemma 4.11. Consider a private d-random protocol to compute a boolean function f. Fix random tapesR = (R 1 ; : : :; R n ). Recall that V iew k i (x;r) is the view of player P i at round k on inputx and vector of random tapesr. Then, for any P i , V iew k i (ỹ;R) can assume at most 2 d+2 di erent values (over the values ofỹ).
Proof. Partition the input assignmentsx into 4 groups according to the value of x i (0 or 1), and the value of f(x) (0 or 1). We argue that the number of di erent values the view can assume within each such group is at most 2 d . Fix an inputx in one of these 4 groups and consider any other inputỹ pertaining to the same group. Recall that C k i (ỹ;R) is the communication string seen by player P i until round k on inputỹ and when the random tapes of the players areR. If the value of C k i (ỹ;R) is some communication string C i , then by the privacy requirement 6 , communication C i must also occur by round k when the input isx, and the vector of random tapes is someR 0 = (R 0 1 ; : : :; R 0 n ), where R 0 i = R i . Thus, the value of C k i (ỹ;R) must also appear as C k i (x;r) for some vector of random tapes. However, by Lemma 4.10, C k i (x;r) can assume at most 2 d values (over the values ofr). Thus, C k i (ỹ;R) can assume at most 2 d values over the possible input assignments that pertain to the same group. Now, observe that V iew k i (ỹ;r) is determined by the input bit y i , the communication string C k i (ỹ;r), and the random tape r i . Therefore, onR and on two input assignments y andỹ 0 of the same group (in particular y i = y 0 i ), if V iew k i (ỹ;R) 6 = V iew k i (ỹ 0 ;R) then C k i (ỹ;R) 6 = C k i (ỹ 0 ;R). Thus, V iew k i (ỹ;R) can assume at most 2 d di erent values over the input assignments that pertain to the same group. The privacy requirement is de ned on the nal communication string, but this clearly implies the same requirement on any pre x of it. 9
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Lemma 4.12. Consider a private d-random protocol to compute a boolean function f, and consider speci c vector of random tapesR, and the deterministic protocol derived by it. Then for every player P i , the function V iew k i (x;R) (as a function ofx only) has sensitivity of at most Q(k) 4 = (2 d+2 ) k?1 . Proof. First note that since we x the random tapes, the views of the players are functions of the input assignmentx only. We prove the lemma by induction. For k = 1 the view of any player depends only on its single input bit. Thus, the claim is obvious. For k > 1 assume the claim holds for any`< k. This implies in particular that all messages received by player P i and included in the view under consideration have sensitivity of at most Q(k ? 1). Clearly the input bit itself has sensitivity 1 which is at most Q(k ? 1). Thus the view under consideration is composed of bits each having sensitivity at most Q(k ? 1). Moreover, by Lemma 4.11 the view can assume at most 2 d+2 values. It follows from Lemma 4.8 that the sensitivity of the view under consideration is at most Q(k ? 1) (2 d+2 ? 1) Q(k). (Note that Lemma 4.8 allows us to give a bound which does not depend on the number of messages received by P i .)
We can now give the lower bound on the number of rounds, in terms of the sensitivity of the function and the number of random bits.
Theorem 4.13. Given a private d-random protocol (d 2) to compute a boolean function f, consider the deterministic protocol derived from it by any given random tapes R. For any player P i , there is at least one input assignmentx such that T i (x;R) = (log S(f)=d). Proof. Consider a xed but arbitrary player P i . Denote by t the largest round number in which P i outputs a value, i.e., t = maxxfT i (x;R)g. We claim that as long as the sensitivity of the view of P i does not reach S(f), there is at least one input assignment for which P i cannot output the correct value of f. Let Y be an input assignment on which the sensitivity S(f) is obtained. That is, the value of F(Y ) is di erent than the value of F on S(f) of Y 's \neighbors". Hence, if the sensitivity of the view of P i is less than S(f), then the output of P i must be wrong on either Y or on at least one of these \neighbors" (as the sensitivity of the view is an upper bound on the sensitivity of the output). Thus, t is such that S(V iew t i (x;R)) S(f). By Lemma 4.12, we get 2 (d+2)(t?1) S(f), i.e., t logS(f) (d+2) + 1. This proves Theorem 4.9; moreover, it shows not only that there is an input assignmentx and random tapesR for which the protocol runs \for a long time", but also that for each vector of random tapesR there is such input assignment. The following corollary follows for the function xor (using the fact that S(xor) = n). Theorem 4.15. Let A be an r-round 1-random private protocol to compute a boolean function f. Then, r = (S(f)).
To prove the theorem, we restrict our attention to one of the two deterministic protocols derived from the original protocol by a xing the value of the random bit 7 . The messages and views in this protocol are functions of the input vector,x, only. Let Y be an assignment on which S(f), the sensitivity of f, is obtained. The following lemma gives an upper bound on the sensitivity of the view of the player in terms of the round number. We then use this lemma to give a lower bound on the number of necessary rounds.
Lemma 4.17. Let t (S(f)?1)=2 be a round number and P i be any player. Then,
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on t. For t = 1 clearly jG V iew t i (Y )j 1 (since before getting any messages, the view depends only on x i ). For 1 < t (S(f) ? 1)=2 assume the claim holds for any k < t. Denote by M the set of messages 7 We let the identity of the player that tosses this coin to possibly depend on the inputx. However note that if we want that the privacy and 1-randomness properties hold, this cannot be the case. 11
received by P i and included in the view under consideration. Clearly G V iew For the function xor we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.18. Let A be an r-round 1-random private protocol to compute xor of n bits. Then r = (n).
Lower Bounds on the Expected Number of Rounds. As the protocols
we consider are randomized, it is possible that for the same inputx, di erent random tapes for the players will result in executions that run for di erent number of rounds. Hence, it is natural to consider not only the worst case running time but also the expected running time. Usually, saying that a protocol has expected running time r means that for every inputx the expected time until all players nish the execution is bounded by r (where the expectation is over the choices of the random tapes of the players). Here we consider a weaker de nition, which requires only the existence of a player i whose expected running time is bounded by r. As we are proving a lower bound, this only makes our result stronger: It would mean that for every player there is an input assignment for which the expected running time is high. Note that it is not necessarily the case that the rst player that computes the value of the function can announce this value (and thus all players compute the value within one round). The reason is that the fact that a certain player computes the function at a certain round may reveal some information on the inputs, and hence such announcing may violate the privacy requirement (see CGK90]). We rst de ne the expected rounds complexity of a protocol.
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Definition 5.1. (Expected Rounds Complexity) An expected r-round protocol to compute a function f is a protocol to compute f such that there exists a player P i such that for allx, Er T i (x;r)] r.
The lower bound that we prove in this section is in terms of the average sensitivity of the computed function. In particular, we prove an (log n=d) lower bound on the expected number of rounds required by protocols that privately compute xor of n bits. We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2. Let f be a boolean function and let A be an expected r-round d-random private protocol (d 2) to compute the function f. Then, r = (AS(f) log AS(f)=nd).
To prove the theorem we consider a protocol A and x any player P i . We say that the protocol is late on inputx and vector of random tapesR if T i (x;R) log AS(f) 2(d+2) + 1. We de ne a 0?1 random variable L(x;r) to be 1 if and only if the protocol is late onx andr. For the purpose of our proofs in this section we de ne a uniform distribution on the 2 n input assignments (this is not to say that the input are actually drawn by such distribution). Moreover, note that the domain of vectors of random tapes is enumerable.
We rst show that for any deterministic protocol derived from a private protocol to compute f, not only there is at least one input on which the protocol is late, but that this happens for a large fraction of the inputs.
Lemma 5.3. Consider a player P i and any xed vector of random tapesR = (R 1 ; : : :; R n ). Then
Proof. Consider the views of P i , V iew t i , given the vector of random tapesR. For any round t such that t < logAS(f) 2(d+2) + 1, by Lemma 4.12, we get S(V iew t i ) < 2 (d+2) log AS(f) 2(d+2) = q AS(f). Any function g computed from such a view can have at most the same sensitivity, and thus clearly an average sensitivity of at most q AS(f). By Claim 4.7, such a function g can have the correct value for the function f for at most 2 n (1 ?
) input assignments. Since we assume that A is correct for all input assignments, it follows that at least 2 n AS(f)? p AS(f) 2n input assignments are late.
We can now give a lower bound on the expected number of rounds.
Lemma 5.4. Consider a player P i . There is at least one input assignmentx for to compute xor of n bits. Then, r = (log n=d).
Proof. Follows from Theorem 5.2 and the fact that AS(xor) = n.
5.1. Weakly Correct Protocols. In this section we consider protocols that are allowed to make a certain amount of errors. Given a protocol A, denote by A i (x;r) the output of the protocol in player P i , given input assignmentx and vector of random taper = (r 1 ; : : : ; r n ).
Definition 5.6. For < 1=2, a (1 ? )-correct protocol to compute a function f is a protocol that for every player P i and every input vectorx satis es Prr A i (x;r) = f(x)] (1 ? ). Note that while designing a protocol one usually wants a stronger requirement; that is, with high probability all players compute the correct value. With the above de nition, it is possible that in every execution of the protocol at least one of the players is wrong. However, as our aim now is to prove a lower bound this weak de nition only makes our result stronger.
In the following theorem we give lower bounds on the number of rounds and on the expected number of rounds for weakly correct protocols.
Theorem 5.7. Let f be a boolean function. ? q 2 ) log AS(f) d ). Proof. We rst prove the lower bound on the number of rounds, and then turn our attention to the expected number of rounds. The correctness requirement implies that for any player P i , Prr A i (x;r) = f(x)] 1 ? , for allx. This implies that there exists a vector of random tapesR such that for at least 2 n (1 ? ) input assignmentsx, A i (x;R) = f(x). As in the proof of Lemma 5.3 (using Claim 4.7), it follows that before round number logAS(f) 2(d+2) + 1, the protocol can be correct on at most 2 n (1 ?
inputs (with random tapesR). Since we require that at least 2 n (1 ? ) are correct, we have that at least We now turn to the lower bound on the expected number of rounds of (1 ? )-correct protocols. Consider a player P i . De ne a 0 ? 1 random variable G(x;r) to be 1 if and only if A i (x;r) = f(x). Then, the correctness requirement implies that Er G(x;r)] 1 ? , for allx. It follows that for anyR the probability thatR satis es Ex G(x;R)] 1 ? 6. Conclusion. In this paper we initiate the quantitative study of randomness in private computations. As mentioned in the introduction, our work was already followed by additional work on this topic BDPV95, KM96, KOR96, CKOR97].
We give upper bounds and lower bounds on the number of rounds required for computing xor privately with a given number of random bits. Alternatively, we give bounds on the number of random bits required for computing xor privately within a given number of rounds. Our lower bounds extend to other functions in terms of their sensitivity (and average sensitivity).
An obvious open problem is to close the gap between the upper bound and the lower bound for computing xor using d random bits. One possible way of doing this is to improve the bound given by Lemma 4.8.
Corollary 4.14 shows a lower bound of (log n=d) rounds for such a computation. In this section we prove a stronger lower bound than the one proved in Section 4 but in a weaker model. In this model, each player is allowed to send a single non-constant message. More precisely, each player sends only a single non-constant message to a speci c other player, and this other player is the same in all runs. Note that the protocol presented in Section 3 has this property.
Again, we consider the protocol obtained by xing a speci c vector of random tapesR = (R 1 ; : : : ; R n ). The main observation is that the above property implies that if a player receives two messages then the sets of variables on which the two messages depend are disjoint.
In the following we prove an extension of Lemma 4.12, which gives an upper bound on the sensitivity of the view of the players. To do so, we rst prove a stronger version of Lemma 4.8 for the case that each function depends on a di erent set of variables. We then give a slight variation of the proof of Lemma 4.12, using the new lemma instead of Lemma 4.8. Proof. First note that since we x the random tapes the views of the players are functions of the input assignmentx only. We prove the lemma by induction. For k = 1 the view of any player depends only on its single input bit. Thus the claim is obvious. For k > 1 assume the claim holds for any`< k. This implies in particular that all messages received by player P i and included in the view under consideration have sensitivity of at most Q(k ? 1). Consider the view without the input bit x i and denote it by F; this is composed of only the messages received by P i and the bits read from the (local) random tape. Using Lemma 4.11, and Lemma A.1 with C = Q(k ? 1), we have that F has sensitivity at most Q(k?1) d = (d+1) k?2 d. The view under consideration, V iew k i (x;R), has an additional single bit, which has clearly sensitivity at most 1. We thus have that the sensitivity of V iew k i (x;R) is at most (d + 1) k?2 d + 1 Q(k). Theorem A.3. Given a private d-random protocol (d 2) to compute a boolean function f that has the special property under consideration, consider the deterministic protocol derived from it by any given vector of random tapesR. For every player P i , there is at least one input assignmentx such that T i (x;R) = (log S(f)= log d).
The proof follows the proof of Theorem 4.13, using Lemma A.2 instead of Lemma 4.12. The lower bound of this section is stated in the following corollary. Corollary A.5. Let A be an r-round d-random private protocol (d 2 ) to compute xor of n bits that has the property under consideration. Then r = (log n= log d).
A.2. A Special Case { Protocols with Messages of a Special Type. As proved in Section 3, xor can be computed privately with d random bits in O(log n= log d) rounds. For general protocols, Corollary 4.14 shows a lower bound of (log n=d) rounds, while in a special case (in which the upper bound falls) Corollary A.5 gives a tight (log n= log d) lower bound on the number of rounds. Here we consider another special case in which each message m can be expressed as a boolean function f(x) g(r), of the n-entry input vectorx, and a d-entry binary random tape,r. Again, our upper bound satis es this restriction, and the lower bound we prove in this case is tight (i.e., (log n= log d)). One can think of such protocols as those which are designed (as we do in Section 3) by rst designing a non-private protocol, and then \masking" the messages with random noise (which is canceled at the end). In particular, each player can toss all of its coins before the protocol starts (the number of coins tossed may depend however on the outcome of previous coin tosses). The particular masking bit that is used for each message is not to depend on the input to the players.
The idea of the proof is to consider the number of input variables which are good (with respect to the computed function f) in the view of a player at some round k (as in Section 4.3.1 9 ). Clearly, the input variable of the player may be good. Other good variables can be those that are good for any of the messages that this player received in a previous round. The key ingredient in the proof will be to show that the number of messages received by any player, that are \bene cial" to increase the number of good variables in its view, is at most d (otherwise, the privacy requirement is violated). From this we get that the number of good variables at round k is O((d+1) k?1 ). In order for a player to output the correct value of f its view must have at least S(f) good variables. The result will follow.
More precisely, consider a private protocol (with the property under consideration) to compute a boolean function f. Consider the messages M 1 ; : : : ; M m received by some player P j during the protocol. By assumption, we can write each of these messages, M`, as M`(x;r) = f`(x) g`(r). Denote by Y an input assignment on which f achieves its sensitivity S(f). Let , and x j is equal in both of them, the privacy requirement (with respect to P j ) is violated.
The important consequence of the above claim is that m 0 d. This is because, by Lemma 4.10, there are at most 2 d di erent vectors for (g 1 (r); : : :; g m 0 (r)). We are now ready to prove the theorem: Theorem A.7. Let A be an r-round d-random private protocol (d 2 ) to compute a boolean function f, such that A has the property that each message M`can be expressed as f`(x) g`(r). Then r = (log S(f)= log d).
Proof. Recall that Y is an input assignment on which f has sensitivity S(f) and that by \good" we refer to \good on Y ". We rst prove, by induction, that the view of any player in round k, on input Y , can have at most (d + 1) k?1 good variables, or at least S(f) good variables. This is certainly true in the rst round, where the view can have at most one good variable. Now consider the view of P j in round k. Denote by M the set of messages received by the player. If the view has less than S(f) good variables, then j m2M G m (Y ) (S f (Y ) \ fx j g)j S(f) ? 1. By Claim A.6, it follows that there can be at most d messages each of which has at least one good variable which is not x j , and such that each one has at least one such good variable that the previous 20 ones (in the order we de ned) do not have. Each of these messages was received in one of the previous rounds, and has less than S(f) good variables, hence by the induction hypothesis has at most (d + 1) k?2 good variables. Thus, the view of P j at round k can have at most d (d + 1) k?2 + 1 (d + 1) k?1 good variables.
To prove the theorem, x some vector of random tapesR and consider the views obtained when running the deterministic protocol derived by it. As remarked before, due to the special type of message, the set of good variables is the same for all random tapes. Obviously, the view of a player that outputs the value f must have S(f) good variables (on Y ). Let t be the rst round in which some player P j has view with at least S(f) good variables. Order the messages received by P j in round t in an arbitrary order. Then, there is the rst message m after which the view of P j has at least S(f) good variables. This message m has at most (d + 1) t?2 good variables, by the above claim (as m was produced from a view of a previous round, which has less than S(f) good variables). On the other hand, just before this message is received, the view of the player does not have S(f) good variables; therefore, by the above claim, it has at most (d + 1) t?1 good variables. We thus have, S(f) (d + 1) t?1 + (d + 1) t?2 ; which gives the required lower bound on t.
Corollary A.8. Let A be an r-round d-random private protocol (d 2 ) to compute xor of n bits that has the property under consideration. Then r = (log n= log d). 
